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ABSTRACT Immigrants who marry outside of their ethnicity tend to have better economic
outcomes than those who marry within ethnicity. It is difficult, however, to interpret this
relationship because individuals with stronger preferences for ethnic endogamy are likely to differ
in unobserved ways from those with weaker preferences. To clarify some of the complex issues
surrounding interethnic marriage and assimilation, this chapter starts by considering the
determinants of intermarriage, proceeds with an examination of the economic consequences of
intermarriage, and ends with a discussion of the links between intermarriage, ethnic
identification, and measurement of long-term socioeconomic integration.
1. INTRODUCTION
Interethnic marriage rates have often been used as a proxy for the extent of assimilation by
immigrant groups (Pagnini and Morgan 1990; Qian and Lichter 2007). Sometimes referred to as
“the final stage of assimilation” (Gordon 1964), marriages between immigrants and natives
simultaneously measure immigrants’ views of the host society and natives’ views of the foreign
born. Moreover, interethnic marriages can have direct impacts on the participants, including the
children produced by these unions. Immigrants that resemble natives are more likely to
intermarry, but in sharing a life with a native, immigrants may become even more similar to
natives. Closely related to spouse selection and assimilation is ethnic identity, which itself can
have important implications for how researchers measure intergenerational integration.
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This chapter selectivity surveys recent research on these issues by economists and other
social scientists. Section 1 discusses the causes of intermarriage, differentiating between
determinants related to direct preferences for ethnic endogamy, indirect preferences, and
opportunity structures. Section 2 examines the economic consequences of intermarriage, focusing
on the empirical methods used to identify causal effects. Section 3 discusses the strong links2
between intermarriage and ethnic identification and the potential problems that arise for tracking
the socioeconomic progress of later-generation descendants of immigrant groups. A final section
summarizes and concludes.
2. DETERMINANTS OF INTERETHNIC MARRIAGE
In his pioneering work on the economics of marriage, Becker (1973) develops a model of
household formation whereby the marriage market generates couples that match on traits which
are complements in the production of household goods. Conceptualizing these household goods
as companionship, healthy and happy children, and quality of meals, for example, he cites
education, religion, and race as examples of traits which are likely to be complements in
production. In Lam’s (1988) model of marriage, the gains from marriage result from the joint
consumption, as opposed to production, of household public goods. Since many of the
commodities produced within families are also jointly consumed within families, it is optimal for
marriages to form between people with similar demands for these goods.
Because ethnic backgrounds of spouses are likely to be complements in the production of
ethnicity-related household public goods (such as vacations to the homeland and ethnic meals),
both Becker and Lam’s models predict marriage market matching based on ethnic background.
For similar reasons, spouse-searchers may also find it optimal to match on education, age,
language, and religion, for example. In Becker’s model, couples are formed in a manner which
maximizes aggregate surplus in the marriage market. However, in a world with search costs,
optimal matches do not always occur, forcing marriage market participants to make decisions
about the characteristics of spouses they value most. Moreover, given the spatial distribution of
these traits and the fact that marriage markets tend to be local, ultimate marriage patterns will also
depend on who belongs to particular marriage markets.
Thus, the determinants of intermarriage can be classified into three main categories. Starting
with the most obvious, some characteristics are suggestive of stronger preferences for ethnic3
goods consumed within families. Recently arrived immigrants, for example, are likely to value
shared ethnicity with a spouse more than people whose families have been in the host country for
several generations. The second category relates to preferences for spouse characteristics which
are not in themselves about ethnicity, but happen to be more or less common among co-ethnics.
For example, high endogamy rates among vegetarian Indians may be driven by tastes for
marrying vegetarians, which are relatively more common among Indians, as opposed to tastes for
marrying other Indians per se. The final category does not concern preferences at all but is instead
related to opportunity. If because of ethnic residential segregation, spouse-searchers are more
likely to meet potential spouses with the same ethnic background, then high endogamy rates may
result even if marriage market participants are randomly matched with each other.
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Several researchers have empirically examined the determinants of ethnic intermarriage.
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Comparisons between studies are not perfectly straightforward because they use different
samples, different definitions of intermarriage, and include different control variables. In fact,
while the term “immigrant” most often refers to the foreign born, in some countries, nationality
determines immigrant status so that people who were born and raised in a country may be
considered foreign if they are not citizens of that country. Even studies relying on US Census data
are not directly comparable because questions asked in the Census varied from year to year. For
example, Furtado (2012) uses 1970 data on native-born males with two immigrant parents and
classifies a marriage as endogamous if a spouse has at least one parent born in the country of birth
of the male’s father. Chiswick and Houseworth (2011) use 1980 data on immigrants who arrived
in the US before marriage and define ethnic endogamy based both on country of birth and
ancestry. Furtado and Theodoropoulos’ (2011) analysis of 2000 data uses immigrants who arrived
in the US before the age of 18 and the native-born who identify with a particular ancestry. The
authors classify a marriage as endogamous if both spouses identify with the same ancestry.
Despite the different samples and variable definitions, several results appear very robust across
studies.4
Preferences for Marrying within Ethnicity
We start by considering those characteristics which are likely to directly impact people’s
preferences for marrying a co-ethnic. Recently arrived immigrants are more likely to marry
endogamously as are immigrants who arrived as older adults (Chiswick and Houseworth 2011).
Relative to the foreign born, the native born with two immigrant parents are more likely to marry
outside of their ethnicity and the native born with only one foreign-born parent are even more
likely to marry out (Kalmijn and van Tubergen 2010). Individuals who identify with multiple
ancestries are also likely to marry exogamously (Chiswick and Houseworth 2011). Given that
parents tend to prefer endogamous marriages for their children (Kalmijn 1998), people who are
more tied to the family home are more likely to marry within ethnicity. Not surprisingly
therefore, people who marry young are more likely to marry endogamously, while second and
higher order marriages are less likely to be endogamous (Chiswick and Houseworth 2011).
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There are also certain characteristics which tend to make people more open to marrying
outside of their ethnic group. Participation in the military is associated with more exogamous
marriages (Furtado and Theodoropoulos 2011; Chiswick and Houseworth 2011), potentially
because the military forces soldiers to leave their potentially homogeneous home environments
and interact with people from various racial and ethnic groups (Fryer 2007).
Certain features of people’s ethnic backgrounds may also make them more accepting of
outsiders. Measuring globalization using a combination of several variables--the sum of imports
and exports of books, the number of Ikea stores per capita, and the number of McDonalds per
capita--Kalmijn and van Tubergen (2010) find that indeed people from more globalized countries
are more likely to marry natives. Moreover, even when they marry immigrants or second-
generation immigrants, their spouses are less likely to share their ethnic background. Males from
countries with more ethnic heterogeneity (as measured by Alesina et al. 2003) are also more5
likely to marry natives than to marry immigrants or second-generation immigrants from the same
origin country (Kalmijn and van Tubergen 2010).
Preferences for Other Characteristics
Turning next to the second category of intermarriage determinants, we consider the role of
preferences for characteristics which are not directly related to ethnicity but happen to be
correlated with ethnic background. In his seminal paper on the economics of marriage, Becker
(1973) cites religion as an example of a trait which is likely to be complementary in the
production of household goods. Religious practices in general and especially the religious
upbringing of children can be viewed as household public goods, making it optimal, according to
Lam’s theory, for marriage market participants to match with someone with the same religion.
Empirically, Lehrer (1998) and more recently Sherkat (2004) find evidence that marrying
someone of the same faith is important for spouse-searchers, especially those in certain religions.
Chapter ? (RELIGIOUSITY OF IMMIGRANTS) of this Handbook specifically considers the
religiosity of immigrants.
Given the relationship between religion and ethnic background—Italians tend to be Catholic,
Israelis Jewish, and Iranians Muslim—a preference for marrying someone of the same faith may
increase the likelihood of marrying a co-ethnic. Empirically examining this hypothesis is difficult
because the most often used data sets for studying ethnic intermarriage, at least in the United
States, do not contain information on religious background. Noting that the US is predominantly
Christian, Kalmijn and Van Tubergen (2010) start by considering the impact of the percentage of
a person’s home country that is Christian on the probability of marrying within ethnicity.
Proxying for a person’s religion using the dominant religion in that person’s country of origin,
they also construct the percentage of respondents in a state who have the same religion after
subtracting the number of people from the same country of origin. As might be expected, a
Christian background is associated with fewer ethnic intramarriages. In addition, religious6
similarities to other ethnic groups increase the likelihood of marrying a first or second-generation
immigrant from a different country of origin.
Marital preferences need not arise from optimality conditions in models of household
production or consumption. Tastes for spouse characteristics may simply reflect social norms. For
example, Belot and Fidrmuc (2010) study gender asymmetries in the propensity to outmarry,
noting especially that while black males are significantly more likely to marry whites than black
females, the opposite is true for Chinese. They present evidence suggesting that preferences for
taller husbands than wives, in combination with differences in height distributions across ethnic
groups, can explain a significant portion of the gender asymmetries in intermarriage rates.
Opportunity for Endogamous Marriages
Regardless of people’s preferences for whom to marry, a prerequisite for marriage, at least in
modern day society, is that marriage market participants first meet. Independent of preferences,
ultimate endogamy patterns will be heavily influenced by the availability of potential partners
with the same ethnic background. People from immigrant groups that are not highly represented
in the host country will find it more difficult to encounter co-ethnics in the everyday course of
their lives. Thus, group size is likely to be an important determinant of intermarriage. In addition,
because marriage markets are not national, groups with diffuse settlement patterns are likely to
have lower endogamy rates than groups with concentrated settlement patterns.
It is difficult to determine the precise size of spouse-searchers marriage markets. Given
tendencies for ethnic groups to self-segregate, defining a marriage market which is too large is
likely to underestimate people’s opportunities for endogamous marriages. On the other hand,
because people with stronger ethnic preferences are more likely to choose to live in ethnic
enclaves, defining marriage markets which are too small can confound the roles of ethnic
preferences and opportunity. It may not be surprising, therefore, that researchers choose different
levels of geography on which to construct availability measures.7
Furtado (2012) constructs marriage markets based on county group, the smallest identifiable
geographic area publically available from the 1970 US Census Micro Data. Furtado and
Theodoropoulos (2011) use metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) which are larger than the 2000
equivalent of county groups. Presumably even more concerned that using small geographic areas
confounds the role of preferences and opportunity, Kalmijn and Van Tubergen (2010) use states.
Drawing on information from metropolitan areas and states, Chiswick and Houseworth (2011)
construct measures of opportunity using data from the Census year around which people were
most likely making marriage decisions. Thus, marriage market variables for 18-27 year olds in
1980 are constructed using 1980 Census data while variables for 46-64 year olds in 1980 are
constructed using the 1960 Census. Regardless of how they are defined, these studies consistently
find that more contact opportunities with co-ethnics are associated with stronger tendencies to
marry a co-ethnic.
Sex ratios are another important factor in determining the likelihood of encountering an
acceptable same-ethnicity spouse. Chiswick and Houseworth (2011) construct availability ratios
as the number of males of appropriate age from the same ethnic group living in a geographic area
divided by a corresponding number of females, taking into account the fact that husbands are
typically two years older than wives. While they find that sex ratios are important predictors of
endogamy, Kalmijn and Van Tubergen (2010) fail to find a similar role for sex ratios defined in a
slightly different way. We conclude therefore that the estimated effect of sex ratios on endogamy
patterns is not as robust as the estimated effect of group size. This may be because variation in
sex ratios is driven by some characteristics of the geographic area, such as labor market
opportunities, which affect intermarriage patterns directly.
Characteristics that Affect Endogamy through Multiple Mechanisms
Some traits do not fit perfectly into only one of the three categories above but instead affect
marriage decisions through multiple avenues. Furtado (2012) and Furtado and Theodoropoulos8
(2011) present evidence suggesting that education affects endogamy decisions through all three
mechanisms discussed above. By what they call the cultural adaptability effect, schooling makes
people more accepting of cultural differences in spouses resulting in a decreased likelihood of
marrying within ethnicity. By the enclave effect, schooling increases the probability of leaving
ethnic enclaves, potentially to acquire schooling or because education is associated with more
geographically dispersed labor markets (Wozniak 2010). With fewer opportunities for
encountering co-ethnics, people with more schooling are less likely to marry endogamously.
Finally, the assortative matching effect starts with the premise that people have a preference for
marrying someone with a similar level of education, as suggested theoretically in Becker (1973)
and Lam (1988) and empirically in Schwartz and Mare (2005). Thus, the effect of schooling on
ethnic endogamy should depend on the distribution of education by ethnic group. More
specifically, education should decrease the probability of marrying within ethnicity for people in
low education groups but increase that probability for people in high education groups.
A spouse search model developed in Furtado (2006) demonstrates how these mechanisms
operate in a theoretical perspective, while using 1970 US Census data on second-generation
immigrants with two foreign-born parents, Furtado (2012) shows that controlling for the enclave
effect, there is no empirical support for the cultural adaptability effect but the assortative
matching effect seems to be an important mechanism through which schooling affects marriage
decisions. Using more recent data on the foreign born who arrived before the age of 18 and
natives who identify with a particular ancestry, Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2011) find evidence
for all three mechanisms. Measuring assortative matching on education in different ways,
Chiswick and Houseworth (2011) as well as Kalmijn and Van Tubergen (2010) also find
evidence consistent with both cultural adaptability and assortative matching effects of education.
Host country language acquisition is likely to affect endogamy patterns in similar ways.
However, while language proficiency is associated with weaker propensities to marry within
ethnicity (Furtado 2012, Furtado and Theodoropoulos 2011), interpretation of this relationship is9
difficult given that people with stronger ethnic attachments are more likely to marry
endogamously and less likely to learn the host country language. Chiswick and Houseworth
(2011) address this issue by examining the effect of linguistic distance of the immigrant’s mother
tongue from English. Although they generally find that people whose native languages are farther
linguistically from English are less likely to outmarry, women who speak the languages furthest
away from English, Korean and Japanese, are in fact more likely to intermarry, suggesting that
something besides language is driving results. Using a potentially more exogenous source of
variation in identifying the role of language, Bleakley and Chin (2010) show that English
proficiency does indeed have a negative causal effect on the probability that immigrants marry
someone with the same country of birth.
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These studies are not able to disentangle the mechanisms through which host country
language acquisition affects endogamy patterns but Kalmijn and van Tubergen (2010) show that
an increase in the number of people from other countries that speak the same language increases
the likelihood of marrying immigrants or second-generation immigrants from different origin
countries relative to marrying natives. This result is certainly suggestive of an assortative
matching on language effect.
3. LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF INTERETHNIC MARRIAGE
The previous section showed that there are systematic differences between people who choose to
marry within their ethnicity and people who choose to marry-out. Some of these characteristics
may indeed be associated with labor market outcomes, but surely marriage outcomes also depend
on random encounters and idiosyncratic personality traits. A natural question then is whether,
conditional on a person’s preferences and characteristics, spouse’s ethnicity has any impact on
labor market and educational outcomes. Analyzing these effects of intermarriage is interesting in
its own right, but more importantly, spouse ethnicity can be viewed as a proxy for whether a
person’s social circle is comprised mostly of co-ethnics. While the papers discussed in the10
previous section emphasized the distinction between marrying within ethnicity versus outside of
ethnicity, the literature on the economic consequences of intermarriage focus on the distinction
between marrying an immigrant and marrying a native. This section examines this literature on
the labor market impacts of marriage to a native and by extension, association with natives more
generally.
There are several reasons why marriage choice may influence labor market outcomes of
immigrants. While it is true that immigrants fluent in the host country’s language are more likely
to marry outside of their ethnicity (Bleakley and Chin 2010), marrying a native is likely to further
improve an immigrant’s language abilities. A similar story can be told with respect to knowledge
of and comfort with the host country’s customs and social norms. As immigrants become socially
indistinguishable from natives, they are likely to become more successful in the labor market.
Although by definition, marriages involve only two people, in practice, people typically
acquire new friends and acquaintances as they start romantic relationships. Given that personal
connections play a central role in job acquisitions (Ioannides and Loury 2004), social circle
members acquired through marriage may be important in determining the jobs that immigrants
get. It is reasonable to assume that new network members are relatively more likely to be native-
born if an immigrant marries a native and relatively more likely to be an immigrant if he marries
another immigrant. Given that natives are more likely to be employed and tend to have higher
wages (Larsen 2004), social connections to natives are likely to expose immigrants to better labor
market opportunities.
One last mechanism through which marriage may affect wages and employment rates is
purely institutional. For undocumented immigrants, marriage to a native may bring with it the
legal right to work in the host country. Thus, immigrants who may have been limited to under-
the-table work can gain access to a broader range of higher paying more formal jobs.
Within a variety of studies using different samples in different contexts, ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimates unambiguously point to a positive labor market impact of marriage to a11
native. In the seminal paper in this literature, Meng and Gregory (2005) find that intermarried
immigrants earn higher wages than endogamously married immigrants even when controlling for
observable measures of human capital such as schooling, English proficiency, and years since
migration. Similar relationships were found in Denmark (Çelikaksoy 2007), France (Meng and
Meurs 2009), the Netherlands (Gevrek 2009), and the US (Kanterevic 2004; Chi 2010) when not
controlling for selection into different types of marriages.
It is difficult to interpret these results because the immigrants that marry natives are likely to
have different unobservable characteristics than the immigrants that marry other immigrants. If
the immigrants that marry natives are more assimilated, in ways not captured by the assimilation
controls in the models, then ordinary least squares analyses will overstate the labor market returns
to marrying natives. On the other hand, if conditional on the measures of assimilation and human
capital in the models, the immigrants that marry natives have worse unobservable characteristics,
then OLS may actually underestimate the labor market returns to marrying a native.
To address the endogeneity issue, most papers in this literature take an instrumental variables
approach, using marriage market conditions to instrument for marriage to a native. Meng and
Gregory (2005) use two variables, specifically the number of opposite sex individuals from the
person’s age-ethnicity-religion group divided by the total number of opposite sex individuals and
sex ratios within those age-ethnicity-religion cells, to instrument for intermarriage. They find that
IV estimates are larger in magnitude than OLS estimates pointing to negative selection on
observables into marrying a native. Meng and Meurs’ IV is the number of opposite sex
individuals of the same sex, ethnicity and age living in the same region divided by the total
number of opposite sex individuals of the same age and living in the same region. Despite using
region instead of religion in constructing their IV, Meng and Meurs’ (2009) results are similar to
those in Meng and Gregory (2005).
In contrast, Kantarevic (2004) finds that after selection is taken into account, immigrants in
the US who marry natives do not have higher wages than the immigrants who marry other12
immigrants. However, also using US data,
6 Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2010) find that
marrying a native increases employment rates of immigrants, especially those with the lowest
levels of education. If marriage to a native sufficiently increases employment rates of low-wage
immigrants, then selection into the labor force may explain why researchers have failed to find
wage effects of marrying a native in the US.
Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2010) go on to explore the mechanisms through which
marriage to a native affects immigrant employment. With cross-sectional data, it is not possible to
distinguish between language abilities improving after marrying a native or immigrants fluent in
English being more likely to marry natives. However, they show that adding measures of
assimilation, such as English fluency and residence in ethnic enclaves, to the baseline model only
decreases the estimated coefficient on marriage to a native by a rather small amount suggesting
that there must be other mechanisms through which marrying a native increases the employment
probabilities of the foreign born.
To examine whether changes in legal status can explain the employment premium of
marriage to a native without information on immigrants’ past legal statuses, Furtado and
Theodoropoulos (2010) compare the intermarriage returns for immigrants who have
characteristics that are most common among undocumented immigrants, such as low levels of
education and coming from Mexico and Central America, to those for immigrants without these
characteristics. They also compare the returns to marrying a native for Puerto Ricans and
Mexicans. These two groups are similar in terms of language, culture, and average education but
while a majority of undocumented immigrants in the US are Mexican (Passel and Cohn 2009),
Puerto Ricans all have the legal right to work in the US. Furtado and Theodoropoulos also
compare the returns from marrying a native to the returns from cohabiting with a native; this
comparison is interesting because marriage confers legal status whereas cohabitation does not.
These tests suggest that legal status may be part of the explanation for why marriage to a native
increases the employment rate of immigrants, but it is unlikely to be the entire explanation.
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To explore the role of networks, Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2010) formulate and test a
series of hypotheses, based on the network literature, which should hold true if indeed networks
can explain why immigrants married to natives are more likely to be employed. For example,
they find that the largest returns are for immigrants with the lowest levels of education, that is,
those that are most likely to find jobs through networks gained through marriage. They also find
the returns are smallest, or even non-existent, for immigrants living in ethnic enclaves. This
makes sense in that co-ethnics are more likely to have information about job openings in these
ethnic neighborhoods than natives. Consistent with the idea that native contacts are better able to
aid immigrants in finding wage employment than self-employment, the authors find no evidence
that marriage to a native increases the probability of self-employment. In a separate analysis,
Georgarakos and Tatsiramos (2009) also find that marriage to a native decreases the probability
that immigrants start a business but increases the survival rate of the businesses they do start.
Although the intermarriage literature generally points to a positive impact of intermarriage on
labor market success, the validity of all of these results rests on the assumption that the
instruments are not correlated with unobserved determinants of wages or employment rates. IV
estimates of the returns to marrying a native may overestimate the true relationship if immigrants
living in areas with many co-ethnics (or in areas with more males per female) have worse
unobservable characteristics or opportunities. Although this is inconsistent with immigrants
migrating to areas with better labor market conditions—a typical concern in the immigration
literature—it is consistent with the more assimilated and ambitious immigrants leaving their
ethnic enclaves.
To address this concern, several new papers have taken a person fixed effects approach using
panel data (Nekby 2010 and Nottmeyer 2010). Controlling for all person-specific characteristics
which remain stable throughout a person’s lifetime, such as unobserved human capital, they
examine whether immigrant wages are higher post-marriage when they marry natives as opposed
to other immigrants. Using data from Germany, Nottmeyer (2010) finds that, if anything, foreign-14
born males receive a short term boost in earnings shortly after marrying other immigrants and no
statistically significant growth in earnings post-marriage regardless of whether they marry
immigrants or natives. Similarly, Nekby’s (2010) analysis of Swedish data points to pre-marriage
wage growth for immigrants that eventually marry natives but no wage growth post-marriage.
Married immigrant males in her study earn higher wages than single males, but the marriage
premium is similar regardless of whether they marry immigrants from the same country of origin,
immigrants from a different country of origin, or natives.
One interpretation of these findings is that the positive estimated labor market returns to
intermarriage found in other studies are in artifact of either selection into marrying a native or
instrumental variables which do not satisfy the necessary exclusion restrictions. Another
interpretation is that the person fixed effects approaches are only able to identify the returns to the
change in marital status itself as opposed to association with natives more generally. Given the
relatively short panels in both papers, wage comparisons are made just before and just after
marriage. Since a great deal of communication between spouses occurs before marriage, it is
unlikely that this empirical strategy will pick up many of the returns arising from improvements
in host country language fluency or knowledge of social norms. Similarly, because social circles
of husband and wife are likely joined before the actual wedding ceremonies, many of the returns
arising from social networks will not be identified using this approach.
The panel data approach is able to identify any institutional gains marrying a native. Thus, as
long as any required paperwork is processed quickly, the gains to marrying a native as a result of
acquiring the legal right to work in a country would be cleanly identified using a panel approach.
Under this interpretation, however, it should not be surprising that both Nekby and Nottmeyer
find no labor market returns to marrying a native given that Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2010)
find only weak evidence that legal status can explain the employment related returns to marrying
a native.15
Given the difficulties with both the instrumental variables and person fixed effects
approaches to identifying the returns to marrying a native, it seems that natural experiments are in
order. Unfortunately, it is difficult to find situations generating a change in the likelihood of a
particular type of marriage with no impact on labor market opportunities directly. To our
knowledge, no such natural experiment has been studied with respect to wages or employment
rates, but van Ours and Veenman (2010) exploit one such experiment in their study of educational
outcomes of children from interethnic marriages.
Using exogenous variation resulting from the virtually random allocation of Moluccan
immigrants across towns and villages at arrival in the Netherlands, van Ours and Veenman (2010)
find that children with a Moluccan father and a Dutch mother have higher educational attainments
than children with either two Moluccan parents or a Moluccan mother and Dutch father. The
authors conclude that because mothers play a more central role in raising children, it is the origin
of the mother that matters for children’s educational attainment and familiarity with the Dutch
educational system make Dutch mothers especially beneficial.
A remaining question, however, is whether results regarding Moluccan intermarriage in the
Netherlands are generalizable. Using 2000 US Census data, Furtado (2009) explores the
relationship between marriage to a native and educational outcomes of children from these
marriages. Exploiting the fact that parental marriage decisions are made at different times and
often different places than 16-17 year old children’s high school dropout decisions, Furtado
instruments for parental marriage decisions using the size of the foreign born population in the
child’s birth state in 1980 (just before the children in her sample were born) but controls for the
foreign born population in the child’s state of residence in the year 2000 (just after dropout
decisions are made). She finds that without instrumenting, native-born children with two foreign
born parents are more likely to drop out of high school than native-born children with one native-
born parent. After instrumenting for parental marriage type, however, it is the native-born
children with two immigrant parents that are least likely to drop out of high school. In addition,16
models which control for endogeneity do not yield gender differences in the estimated effect of
marriage to a native.
We conclude from this review that marrying a native, and by extension association with
natives more generally, is generally associated with more labor market success of immigrants.
This result is robust to using data from different countries and constructing the instrumental
variables with slightly different functional forms. Positive estimated effects of marriage to a
native, however, are not universal. Kantarevic (2004) does not find any evidence that
intermarriage increases wages for immigrants in the US after controlling for selection into
marrying a native. Using person fixed effects approaches, Nekby (2010) and Nottymeyer (2010)
also find no evidence of a return to marrying a native in Sweden and Germany respectively. With
respect to educational outcomes of children from interethnic marriages, van Ours and Veenman’s
(2010) results conflict with those in Furtado (2009). In the end, it is difficult to determine whether
any conflicting conclusions are a result of the different identification strategies or different
contexts. We conclude, therefore, with a call for research which is able to reconcile the
conflicting results in the literature.
4. INTERMARRIAGE AND ETHNICITY
Sociologists have long recognized the strong links between intermarriage and ethnic attachments.
The links are complex and causality runs in both directions. On the one hand, ethnic preferences
influence the intensity with which individuals seek out co-ethnics as marriage partners, and ethnic
preferences also help determine how readily individuals are accepted as potential mates by those
belonging to other groups. As a result, frequent intermarriage is one of the strongest signals of
social assimilation by an ethnic group (Gordon 1964; Alba and Nee 2003). On the other hand,
interethnic marriage complicates the ethnic origins of the resulting children, which can weaken
the ethnic attachments of these children and of those in subsequent generations of the family tree
(Alba 1990; Waters; 1990; Perlmann and Waters 2007) After a few generations in the United17
States, so much intermarriage had taken place among the descendants of European immigrants
who arrived in the late 1800s and early 1900s that most white Americans could choose among
multiple ancestries or ethnic identities (Alba 1990; Hout and Goldstein 1994; Waters 1990). For
such individuals, ethnicity became subjective, situational, and largely symbolic, and the social
boundaries between these ethnic groups were almost completely erased. Consequently,
intermarriage has been a fundamental source of ethnic flux and leakage in American society
(Lieberson and Waters 1988, Hout and Goldstein 1994, Perlmann and Waters 2007).
In recent years, economists have shown increasing interest in issues related to ethnic
identification and intermarriage. An emerging literature within economics explicitly recognizes
the complexity of ethnic identification and has begun to investigate the consequences of this
complexity for labor market outcomes and policy. In particular, economic models emphasize the
potential endogeneity of identity and suggest mechanisms through which ethnic identification
could be associated with both observed and unobserved characteristics of individuals and groups.
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A related strand of economic research focuses on developing nuanced measures of ethnic identity
and the insights gained from analysis of these new measures (Zimmermann 2007; Constant and
Zimmermann 2008, 2009). To date, most empirical work in the relevant economics literature has
focused on foreign-born immigrants, but some research has begun to analyze the native-born
second generation (Constant, Nottmeyer, and Zimmermann 2009; Nekby, Rodin, and Ozcan
2009; Nekby and Rodin 2010).
An important paper by Bisin and Verdier (2000) provides a useful economic framework for
thinking about endogenous decisions regarding marriage and the socialization of children and
how such decisions influence the evolution of ethnic attachments across generations. A parent
hopes that his children will adopt the parent’s ethnic or cultural traits. A parent can increase the
chances of this happening by marrying a co-ethnic and by exerting greater effort in socializing his
children, but the parent faces increasing marginal costs in searching more intensively for a co-
ethnic spouse and also in exerting greater socialization effort. Therefore, members of larger18
ethnic groups have less incentive to search intensively for a co-ethnic spouse and to exert
socialization effort, because being from a larger group improves your chances of finding a co-
ethnic spouse without searching very hard, and being from a larger group also raises the odds that
your children are socialized in the preferred way with little effort on your part (because the
socializing influence of “society at large” on children is more likely to reflect the ethnic and
cultural traits of larger groups). As a result, minority ethnic groups do not vanish across
generations through assimilation into the majority, because in equilibrium smaller groups have
stronger incentives to in-marry and to socialize their children. In this way, minority groups can
persist indefinitely, despite intermarriage rates that, when linearly extrapolated from the initial
few generations, would suggest a relatively rapid extinction. Instead, endogenous decisions
regarding how hard parents work at inculcating ethnic identity among their children produces
nonlinear assimilation across generations and the survival of small yet distinct ethnic groups.
Bisin, Topa, and Verdier (2004) provide an interesting empirical application of this model to the
dynamics of religious populations within the United States.
Duncan and Trejo (2007, 2009, 2011, 2012) argue that selective intermarriage and the
resulting “ethnic attrition” can generate potentially serious problems for tracking the
socioeconomic progress of later-generation descendants of U.S. immigrant groups. Because of
data limitations, research on the U.S.-born descendants of Hispanic and Asian immigrants
typically must identify the populations of interest using subjective measures of racial/ethnic
identification rather than arguably more objective measures based on the countries of birth of the
respondent and his ancestors (Snipp and Hirschman 2004; Duncan, Hotz, and Trejo 2006). In
particular, this approach is typically the only feasible option for studies that seek to examine long-
term integration by distinguishing immigrant descendants in the third and higher generations
(Borjas 1994; Trejo 1997, 2003; Farley and Alba 2002; Smith 2006; Blau and Kahn 2007). A
potential problem with this approach is that assimilation and intermarriage can cause ethnic
attachments to fade across generations (Alba 1990; Waters; 1990; Perlmann and Waters 2007),19
and therefore subjective measures of racial/ethnic identification might miss a significant portion
of the later-generation descendants of immigrants. Furthermore, if such ethnic attrition is
selective on socioeconomic attainment, then it can distort assessments of integration and
generational progress.
For the specific case of Mexican Americans, Duncan and Trejo (2007, 2009, 2011)
demonstrate the salience of these issues and elucidate the linkages between intermarriage,
generational complexity, and ethnic identification. Analyzing microdata from the Current
Population Survey (CPS) for children living with both parents, Duncan and Trejo (2011) compare
an objective indicator of Mexican descent (based on the countries of birth of the child, his
parents, and his grandparents) with the standard subjective measure of Mexican identification
(based on the response to the Hispanic origin question). Immigrant generations turn out to be
quite complex, and this complexity is closely related to children’s subjective Mexican
identification. For example, only 17 percent of third-generation Mexican children have a
majority of their grandparents born in Mexico. Moreover, third-generation children are virtually
certain of being identified as Mexican if three or four grandparents were born in Mexico, whereas
rates of Mexican identification fall to 79 percent for children with two grandparents born in
Mexico and 58 percent for children with just one Mexican-born grandparent. Overall, about 30
percent of third-generation Mexican children are not identified as Mexican by the Hispanic origin
question in the CPS, and this ethnic attrition is highly selective. In particular, the high school
dropout rate of third-generation Mexican youth (ages 16 and 17) is 25 percent higher when the
sample is limited to those youth subjectively identified as Mexican. This research suggests that
ethnic attrition is substantial among third-generation Mexicans and could produce significant
downward bias in standard measures of attainment which rely on subjective ethnic identification
rather than objective indicators of Mexican descent.
Do these findings necessarily mitigate concerns that Mexican Americans are experiencing
markedly less intergenerational progress than other U.S. immigrant groups (Huntington 2004;20
Perlmann 2005)? Duncan and Trejo (2011) show that available data are likely to understate the
socioeconomic achievement of later-generation Mexican Americans, but what does this imply
about their standing relative to other immigrant groups? Given that intermarriage is the primary
source of this bias, we might expect similar or larger biases for other immigrant groups, because
most other groups exhibit intermarriage rates at least as high as those of Mexicans (Lieberson and
Waters 1988; Lichter and Qian 2005). If the direction of the bias is the same for all groups, then
appropriate corrections could produce no improvement or even deterioration in the relative
position of Mexican Americans.
To address this issue, Duncan and Trejo (2012) investigate selective ethnic attrition for a
wide range of national origin groups from important Hispanic (Mexico, Puerto Rico, Cuba, El
Salvador, and the Dominican Republic) and Asian (China, India, Japan, Korea, and the
Philippines) source countries. Their findings suggest that ethnic attrition generates measurement
biases that vary across national origin groups in direction as well as magnitude, and that
correcting for these biases is likely to raise the socioeconomic standing of the U.S.-born
descendants of most Hispanic immigrants relative to their Asian counterparts. Like Mexicans,
Puerto Ricans are an Hispanic group that shows signs of intergenerational stagnation, and the
extent and selectivity of ethnic attrition seems roughly similar for U.S.-born Puerto Ricans as for
Mexican Americans. The selectivity of ethnic attrition is reversed, however, for Asian-American
groups with comparatively high levels of education, such as U.S.-born Chinese, Japanese,
Koreans, and Indians. Among the descendants of immigrants from these Asian countries, those
with fewer years of schooling are less likely to retain an Asian identification, which suggests that
ethnic attrition inflates standard measures of socioeconomic attainment for later-generation Asian
Americans. Note that these patterns are broadly consistent with the “assortative matching effect”
in Furtado’s (2006, 2012) model of interethnic marriage, which predicts that members of high-
attainment groups who intermarry should be negatively selected in terms of attainment, whereas21




Among academics as well as policy analysts, there is a general appreciation for the association
between the social integration of immigrants and their economic assimilation. From a theoretical
perspective, causality is likely to run in both directions, which makes it difficult to identify
empirically the underlying mechanisms. Another empirical issue is that, while there are many
standard ways to measure economic assimilation, measures of the degree to which immigrants
and their children interact with the host society are not as readily available. This chapter
selectively surveyed the recent economic literature on one particular measure of immigrants’
social integration: interethnic marriage.
We started by considering the determinants of intermarriage, separating them into those
factors which are likely to affect preferences for endogamy directly and those which reflect the
availability of desirable same-ethnicity potential spouses residing within close geographic
proximity. We then turned to an examination of the labor market effects of interethnic marriage.
Most studies find beneficial effects for immigrants who marry natives rather than other
immigrants, even after accounting for the endogeneity of cross-nativity marriage, but this finding
is not universal. In discussing this literature, we offered several ways to interpret seemingly
conflicting results. Ultimately, however, further research is needed—ideally, research that
explores several different sources of exogenous variation in intermarriage within similar
contexts—before we can more definitively determine how and why intermarriage affects
economic outcomes.
Finally, we described some of the emerging economic research on the links between
intermarriage and ethnic identity. Although this literature is still in its infancy, theoretical work
in this area provides important insights into the mechanisms through which ethnicity and culture22
are transmitted across generations, and related empirical work refines our understanding of ethnic
identity and its economic effects and reveals the complexity of immigrant generations. Future
work in this area holds much promise.
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1 See Chapter 1 of this Handbook for a discussion of the relationship between assimilation and ethnic
identity.
2 Many researchers have classified the determinants of intermarriage along these lines. In her study of
black-white intermarriage, Wong (2003) refers to mating taboos, courting opportunities, and differences in
endowments. In Furtado (2012) and Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2011), education affects ethnic
endogamy patterns through the cultural adaptability effect, the assortative matching effect, and the enclave
effect. Kalmijn and van Tubergen (2010) refer to the first category as a cultural and refer to the second and
third categories jointly as structural.
3 In empirically examining the determinants of intermarriage, researchers must assume, either explicitly or
implicitly, that the immigrants in their samples had the opportunity to choose between marrying within
ethnicity or outside of ethnicity. We note, however, that some immigrants are only allowed into a host
country as a result of whom they marry. To address this issue, researchers typically only consider the
marriage decisions of the native born or the foreign born who arrived in a host country before marriageable
age.
4 Although Kalmijn and van Tubergen (2010) do not consider age at marriage directly, they find that early
marriage customs in a person’s country of origin are associated with increases in the likelihood of
endogamy.
5 They exploit the fact that because of developments in the brain, language acquisition is significantly more
difficult after a certain age.
6 In specifying his IV, Kantarevic (2004) takes the percentage of a person’s ethnic group that lives in that
person’s state and divides that by the percentage of natives that live in the state. Measures are constructed
using data on unmarried individuals of the opposite sex. Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2010) use the
proportion of people in the person’s age group living in that person’s MSA that is foreign born as well as
the sex ratio in the person’s country of origin-age group. While Kantarevic’s specifications controlling for
selection do not yield statistically significant results, Furtado and Theodoropoulos’ (2010) OLS and IV
results are not statistically different from each other.
7 Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2010) demonstrate that Puerto Ricans who marry natives are more likely to
be employed than Puerto Ricans who marry immigrants. Chi and Drewianka (2011), however, find that
Puerto Ricans receive no wage gain from marrying a native, whereas the corresponding wage gain for
Mexicans is 30 percent.
8 Examples include Akerlof and Kranton (2000); Bisin and Verdier (2000); Bisin, Topa, and Verdier
(2004); Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005); Darity, Mason, and Stewart (2006); Manning and Roy (2010); and
Bisin, Patacchini, Verdier, and Zenou (2011). Bisin and Verdier (2011) and Chapter ? (ETHNIC
IDENTITY) of this Handbook survey some of the relevant literature.
9 As discussed earlier, Furtado’s model emphasizes how the supplies of potential spouses vary with ethnic-
specific schooling distributions in marriage markets where individuals hope to match on both education and
ethnicity. A college-educated Mexican American, for example, may choose to intermarry because of the
relative scarcity of other Mexican ethnics with a college degree. Asian Americans tend to be
overrepresented on college campuses, however, so for these groups it may instead be the less-educated
individuals that face a more difficult time finding co-ethnics to marry within their education group.
Consequently, this model predicts that members of high-education groups who intermarry should be
negatively selected in terms of education, whereas the selectivity should be positive for intermarried
members of low-education groups. Because intermarriage is a fundamental source of ethnic attrition, the
differences across groups in intermarriage selectivity predicted by Furtado’s model can generate
corresponding differences in the selectivity of ethnic attrition.